计及攻击损益的跨空间连锁故障选择排序方法

A Novel Selection Sorting Method of Cascading Failures Across Space Considering Attack Gain and Cost

为了揭示电网信息物理系统(power grid cyber-physical systems,PGCPS)中由信息攻击引发跨空间连锁故障的演化过程及爆发可能性,从攻击者视角提出了一种基于攻击损益原则的跨空间连锁故障选择排序方法。首先,分析攻击者在此类故障演化过程中的推动作用,构建故障演化过程的有向攻击图,将此类故障抽象为攻击路径;进而,综合考虑攻击代价与攻击收益等因素,提出各攻击路径的攻击损益值计算方法,并探讨不同条件下攻击者对各攻击路径的倾向性选择排序,以推断不同跨空间连锁故障爆发的可能性;最后,在基于CEPRI-36节点的PGCPS仿真环境中,模拟攻击者对各类跨空间连锁故障的倾向性选择并予以仿真验证。

In order to reveal the evolution process and outbreak probability of cascading failures across space (CFAS)caused by cyber attacks in power grid cyber-physical systems(PGCPS),a novel selection sort method of CFAS based on attack gain and cost principle(AGCP)is proposed from the attacker point of view.Firstly,the attacker driving role is analyzed in the evolution process of CFAS,and a directed attack graph of this process is constructed with all CFAS abstracted into attack routes.Secondly,the AGCP value calculation method of attack routes is proposed, considering both the attack gain and cost,and then the attacker selection sort of attack routes is discussed,to infer the outbreak probability of CFAS.Finally,the attacker preferential selection for various CFAS is simulated and verifiedin PGCPS sifnulation environment basedon CEPRI-36 bus.