转售价格维持下的渠道促销-价格决策、主导模式及福利

Promotion-Price Decision Making and Dominant Mode as Well as Welfare of Distribution Channel in Resale Price Maintenance

在生产商与零售商签订了含有转售价格维持条款的交易合同情形下,通过构建分销渠道博弈模型,求解3种主导模式下的均衡解,并进行促销-价格决策分析;探讨均衡主导模式、渠道效率、用户以及社会福利,并从产品定位、网络外部性和差异化主导模式3个角度进行模型拓展。结果表明:转售价格维持和用户忠诚度能提高知名生产商市场份额和利润,而差异化主导模式将影响转售价格维持的合法性;零售商通过促销普通产品能够降低利益损失,此时转售价格维持条款可能失效;当促销效率超过一定阈值时,零售商主导模式具有稳定性,对用户和社会最有利,但分销渠道效率最低;促销效率、产品定位差异以及网络外部性都是影响分销渠道主导模式的主要因素。

Equilibrium results in three dominant modes were solved and were analyzed by establishing game models of supply chain when the manufacturer and the dealer signed a trading contract containing resale price maintenance terms.The promotion-price decision making was analyzed while the equilibrium dominant mode, channel efficiency and customer as well as society welfare were explored. Besides, the basic model was extended from three angels of product positioning and network externalities as well as the differentiated dominant mode.The results indicate that resale price maintenance and customer loyalty are able to increase market share and profits of the famous manufacturer. Differentiated dominant mode differences will affect the legality of resale price maintenance. The dealer can reduce loss of profits by common products promotion. At this time, the provision of resale price maintenance may become invalid. When the promotional efficiency exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer dominant mode is stable equilibrium which is most beneficial to customer and society. However, distribution channel efficiency is the lowest level. Promotion efficiency and product positioning differences as well as network externalities are the main factors influencing dominant mode of distribution channel.