竞争型低碳供应链下考虑参考效应的微分博弈

Differential Game Model in Competitive Low-carbon Supply Chain Considering Reference Effect

针对低碳环境下由两制造商和两零售商组成的竞争型供应链,分别对有无参考效应情形下制造商减排和零售商低碳宣传以及供应链协调问题进行了研究。研究发现,减排和低碳宣传竞争程度越高时,均衡减排和低碳宣传水平越高;制造商的减排量对顾客的参考点的影响比例越高,则其均衡减排水平越低;不同于简单的两级供应链,即使初始减排量和初始参考点的比例较高,制造商减排对参考点影响比例较大、顾客记忆偏向长期、需求参考效应敏感性较高的情形下参考效应仍将损伤供应链的累计贴现收益。

Considering a competitive low-carbon supply chain composed of two manufacturers and two retailers,we try to investigate the optimal carbon abatement,low-carbon promotion and channel coordination in the situations with and without reference effects.We show that the higher the carbon abatement and low-carbon promotion competitive level,the higher the corresponding equilibrium outcomes would be.Moreover,the bigger the influence ratio of carbon abatement on the reference point,the higher the equilibrium carbon abatement would be.In addition,differing from dyadic supply chain,even though the ratio of initial carbon abatement to initial reference point is high,the reference effect would still damage the accumulated discounted earnings when he influence ratio of carbon abatement on the reference point is high,memory of customer is long-term and demand reference effect sensitivity is strong.