国际投资规则中的国家规制权研究

Research on the State Autonomy of the International Investment Rules

国际投资争端解决机制过于维护投资者的利益,从而损害了东道国对其公共利益的规制权,这是国际投资规则面临的重要问题。国家规制权的理论既根植于国家主权理论之中,又与可持续发展的理念密不可分。在投资者—国家争端解决机制下,国家规制权受到限制,这既有国际投资协定中的某些条款存在着模糊性的原因,也是由于双边或区域协定中的国际投资争端解决机制存在着某些固有缺陷所导致。目前,美国和欧盟已经在国际投资协定中,对如何维护国家规制权,有了一些重要的变革。中国应该积极研究欧美国家对国际投资规则的新变革,从而使中国在国际投资协定谈判过程中,更有利地平衡投资者与东道国之间的利益,切实维护国家规制权。

The international investment dispute settlement mechanism preserves the investors' interests excessively and damages the host state autonomy, which is the significant problem of the international investment rules. The theory of the state autonomy rooted in the theory of the state autonomy and connected with the sustainable development theory. The causes of the above mentioned problem are the ambiguity of the clause of the international investment agreements and the shortcoming of the bilateral or regional international investment dispute settlement mechanism. At present, there has appeared some important revolution among the international investment agreement of the America and Europe. China should strengthen the research on these latest revolutions so as to strike a better balance between the investors and the host stats and safeguard the China's national interests.