并购商誉与审计服务定价

Merger Goodwill and Audit Service Pricing

在资本市场中,审计师对会计信息进行签证评价,发表独立审计意见。本文从决策有用性视角,基于代理理论与利益相关者理论,深入分析并购商誉对审计服务定价水平的影响,以期为会计信息使用者提供经验证据,为利益相关者的经济决策服务。结果表明,审计师对并购商誉风险保持了应有的职业谨慎,增加审计收费以确保审计质量;且在区分正、负向盈余管理的分组检验中,以上结论依然成立。研究结论对缓解代理问题及保障利益相关者的合法权益具有一定的实践价值。最后建议,适时改进审计技术方法体系,在评价企业的盈余质量时,对并购商誉可能引致的错报风险给予足够重视;避免低质量审计需求导致的审计收费偏低,确保提高审计质量进而发挥审计应有的治理功效;强化并购商誉的会计信息质量,为利益相关者提供更加可靠的决策依据。

In the capital market,the auditor evaluates the accounting information and makes independent auditing comments.From the perspective of decision usefulness and based on the agency theory and stakeholder theory, this paper makes an in-depth analysis of the impact of M&A goodwill on the pricing level of audit services.It is expected to provide empirical evidence for users of accounting information and serve the economic decision of stakeholders.The results show that the auditors maintain due professional caution to the goodwill risk of M&A and increase the audit fee to ensure the audit quality.Moreover,the above conclusion still holds in the grouping test that distinguishes positive and negative earnings management.The research conclusion has certain practical value to alleviate the agency problem and protect the legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders.Finally,it is suggested that audit methodologies should be improved in a timely manner,and that attention be paid to the risk of misstatement caused by M&A goodwill during the evaluation of earnings quality of enterprises.It is suggested to avoid low audit fees caused by low-quality audit demand,so as to improve audit quality and bring into play the governance effect of audit.It is also suggested to strengthen the quality of accounting information for M&A goodwill and provide more reliable decision-making basis for stakeholders.