家族企业超额控制权与盈余管理研究——基于CEO持股的调节作用

Research on Excessive Control and Earnings Management of Family Enterprises

近年来民营企业在我国资本市场中发挥着越来越重要的作用,其中家族企业因独特的治理结构而深受关注,其治理结构与盈余质量之间的相互作用也成为研究热点。为了深入研究家族企业实际控制人对盈余管理的影响以及总经理在其中的调节作用,基于家族企业金字塔股权结构特征,利用2012-2016年面板数据进行考察。研究表明:实际控制人两权分离度越大,家族企业的应计项目盈余管理与真实活动盈余管理水平均呈现上升趋势;总经理持股比例对二者之间关系具有显著调节作用,总经理持股比例会加剧实际控制人的盈余管理程度且更显著的体现在真实活动盈余管理,这一调节作用并不会因为总经理的类型有实质性的改变。

In recent years, private enterprises have played an increasingly important role in China's capital market. Family enter-prises have received much attention due to their unique governance structure. The interaction between governance structure and earnings quality has also become a research hotspot. In order to deeply study the influence of the actual controllers of the family business on earnings management and the regulatory role of the general manager, based on the characteristics of the equity structure of the family business pyramid, the 2012-2016 panel data was used for investigation. The empirical results show that the greater the separation of the two powers of the actual controller, the surplus management of the accrued items of the family business and the management of the earnings of the real activities show an upward trend; the shareholding ratio of the general manager has a significant adjustment effect on the relationship between the two. The manager's shareholding ratio will aggravate the actual controller's earnings management and is more prominently reflected in the real activity earnings management. This adjustment will not be changed substantially because of the type of general manager.adjustment effect on the relationship between the two. The manager's shareholding ratio will aggravate the actual controller's earnings management and is more prominently reflected in the real activity earnings management. This adjustment will not be changed substantially because of the type of general manager.