商业信用下考虑公平关切的农产品供应链协调研究

Agricultural Product Supply Chain Coordination with Fairness Concern Under Trade Credit

在一市场需求随机且受零售商努力水平影响的二级供应链中,供应商向零售商提供商业信用,考虑零售商公平关切行为对供应链契约及协调性的影响.首先,分别给出集中决策和分散决策下的最优订购量和努力水平;其次,论证了批发契约无法实现供应链的协调,设计了收益共享与成本分担契约实现供应链协调.研究结果表明,收益共享与成本分担契约可实现供应链订购量与努力水平的协调,且随零售商公平关切系数的增加,零售商和供应商的谈判空间会缩小;供应商提供较长的信用期则有助于零售商提高订购量和增加努力水平,供应链成员的效用将提高.

Consider a two-tier supply chain wherein the retailer is fairness concerned and the supplier provides trade credit to the retailer.The question that how the behavior of retailer's fairness concern affects supply chain contract and coordination is posed,considering that market demand is stochastic and dependent on retailer's effort level.Firstly,in this paper,the retailer's optimal ordering quantity and effort level is derived under centralized and decentralized supply chain structure,respectively.Secondly,it is proved that wholesaie-price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain,and thus revenue sharing and cost sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain.The results show that revenue sharing and cost sharing contract can coordinate retailer's ordering quantity and effort level.Furthermore,it shows the bargaining space for retailer and supplier becomes smaller when retailer's effort level on fairness concern increases.At last,it is shown that longer credit period provided by the supplier will induce the retailer to increase order quantity and effort level,and thus increase the utility of supply chain players.