重审经验内容的非概念论——基于获得性和构成性的两种解释

Nonconceptualism of Experiential Content Revisited——Based on the Two Levels of Possession and Constitution

知觉经验的内容是概念的还是非概念的,这一争论成为当代心智哲学和知觉哲学中最重要的论题之一。概念论者和非概念论者的根本分歧在于:知觉经验内容和认知信念内容是否相同。概念论者认为,经验是与信念类似的一种心理表征内容,而非概念论者则否认这一点。非概念论者通过论证人类与动物在经验上的连续性,经验与信念在内容系统性、丰富性和精细性上的根本差别来辩护经验内容的非概念性。然而,这类辩护首先混淆了概念论在获得性和构成性两个层面的不同涵义;其次,它们既不能被看作是对构成性概念论的挑战,也没有彻底击败获得性层面的概念论;最后,对于信念或经验的构成成分到底是什么,这场争论中的激辩双方都没能提供融贯的解释。因此,从目前已有的非概念论论证中不能得出经验内容完全是非概念的结论。

The debate over whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual has become a fierce issue in contemporary philosophy of mind and perception.The fundamental difference between conceptualists and nonconceptualists is whether the content of perceptual experience is the same as that of cognitive belief.This paper distinguishes the two kind of debates between conceptualism and nonconceptualism on the two levels of possession and constitution,and re-examines three important strategies for defending non-conceptualism-the argument of continuity,systematicity,richness and fineness of grain. Although they all attempt to show that perceptual content is non-conceptual,neither can they be seen as challenge to constructive level of conceptualism nor as complete defeat of conceptualism at the possession level.And there is still no unified explanation basis for what constitutes belief or experience.Therefore,the position that experience is nonconceptual is still untenable.