非正式、短期化农地流转契约与自我执行——基于关联博弈强度的分析

Informal,Short-Term Farmland Transfer Contract and Its Self-Execution:Perspective of Associated Game Analyzing Framework

本文从关联博弈角度出发,将契约形式,契约期限和契约执行稳定性纳入到统一框架中进行解释。结合全国九省(区)608个转出农户样本数据表明:交易对象之间关联博弈强度的越高,农地流转中违约发生的可能性越低,农户越可能选择非正式、短期化的农地流转契约。农户契约选择是理性计算的结果。利用不同计量模型以及从转入方的角度分析都发现该结论是稳健的。可见,加强交易双方的关联博弈强度,能有效制约双方的违约行为,保证契约的自我执行与稳定。

Most of the previous literature didn't put the form and duration of land renting con- tract into the same analytical framework,ignoring the inherent logic among the contract form, contract term and contract execution.From the perspective of the associated game theory,this paper incorporates the contract form,duration and its execution into a unified framework.Using the data of 608lessor households in 9provinces ,we find that the larger of the strength of the associated game, the more stable the contract will be and the farmers are more likely to choose the informal and short-term contract.Farmers'Contract choice is the result of rational calculation.Using different econometric models and testing from the perspective of entrants,we find that the conclusion is still robust.Therefore ,Enhancing the strength of the associated games between the two parties of transaction can effectively lower the defaults and ensure the self-execution and stability of the contract.