政策性与独立性:农业信贷担保机构运营的动态权衡

Policy versus Independence:Study on Dynamic Balance of Agriculture Credit Guarantee Institutions Operating Mechanism

农业信贷担保机构既需要实现为农业服务的政策目标,又存在防范金融风险的现实需要。因此如何平衡政策性与独立性成为其持续经营的关键。基于不完全信息动态博弈模型。本文对担保机构与农业组织的博弈过程进行理论分析和数据模拟。结果显示:不考虑外部风险管理机制,担保机构对借款人盈利能力的要求超过了许多农业组织的实际水平;引入农业保险并未改变担保机构对农业组织守信概率的临界值要求,但农业组织保持守信策略的资产报酬率临界值降低了12%,增强了守信动力;引入担保平台对农业组织影响较小,但将担保机构对守信概率的要求降低了17%,提高了担保机构的担保意愿。因此,完善的外部风险管理措施不仅有助于农业信贷担保机构控制信贷风险,而且能够扩大担保覆盖面。

Agriculture credit guarantee institutions should provide policy-oriented services and prevent financial risk and the key is to balance policy and independence.Based on a dynamic game theory with incomplete information,this paper analyzes the game process and implements a digital simulation.The simulation results show that the demand for the borrower's profitability by the guarantee institution will exceed the actual level of many agricultural organizations if the external risk management mechanism is not taken into account.The introduction of agricultural insurance did not change the critical value of the guarantee institution's fiduciary probability,but the critical value of the return on assets of the agricultural organization's fiduciary strategy was reduced by 12%,which enhanced the motive of fiduciary.The introduction of guarantee platform has little impact on agricultural organizations,but it reduces the requirement of guarantee institutions for the probability of compliance by 17%,and improves the guarantee willingness of guarantee institutions.Therefore,the improvement of the external risk management mechanism can not only help agricultural credit guarantee institutions to control credit risk,but also expand the coverage of guarantee.