民营企业薪酬攀比与企业管理效率研究——基于管理层持股与产品市场竞争的权变视角

Salary Comparison and Enterprise Management Efficiency in Private Enterprises——Based on the Contingent View of Managerial Ownership and Product Market Competition

管理效率的高低影响着企业的竞争力,也影响着企业的长期发展。本文选择薪酬攀比作为影响企业管理效率的新因素,探索薪酬攀比与企业管理效率之间的关系,并在此基础上讨论管理层持股、产品市场竞争及股权集中度对两者关系所具有的情境效应.以2005-2014年中国制造业A股民营上市公司为样本的实证结果显示:薪酬攀比与企业管理效率之间呈现倒U型关系,适度的薪酬攀比对企业管理效率具有促进作用,而过度的薪酬攀比将不利于企业管理效率的提升;管理层持股能够强化薪酬攀比与企业管理效率两者之间的倒U型关系;产品市场竞争弱化了主效应之间的倒U型关系。此外,在股权集中度高的公司,薪酬攀比与企业管理效率之间的倒U型关系更显著。

The efficiency of management affects the competitiveness of enterprises,and also affects the long-term development of enterprises.This paper chooses salary comparison as a new influencing factor of management efficiency of enterprises,explores the relations.hip between salary comparison and manage- ment efficiency of enterprises,and discusses contextual effects of managerial ownership,product market competition and ownership intensity.Using the data of Ashare private listed companies in manufacturing industry from 2005to 2014,we find that there is an inverted U-shape relation betweenpay comparison and enterprise management efficiency,which means moderate salary comparison can promote the efficiency of enterprise management,whereas excessive salary comparison will influence the improvement of enterprise management efficiency,managerial ownership can strengthen the relationship between the efficiency of enterprise management and salary comparison,and product market competition can weaken the inverted U relationship between main effects.In addition,in these companies with high ownership intensity,the inverted U relationship between salary comparison and enterprise management efficiency is more significant.