丈母娘经济:婚姻匹配竞争对住房市场的非线性冲击

The Mother-in-law Economy:Nonlinear Impact of Marriage Matching Competition on Housing Market

能否揭示出住房价格不断上涨背后的根源是科学管理和有效调控的关键。基于信号传递模型,通过对适婚人群婚姻决策的刻画,展示了婚姻匹配竞争对住房市场的作用原理。在此基础上,运用面板门槛模型方法对31个省(直辖市、自治区)2007年至2016年间婚姻匹配竞争与住房市场的关系进行了量化分析。结果表明:第一,婚姻匹配竞争是"丈母娘经济"产生的根源。第二,婚姻匹配竞争对住房市场具有显著的非线性影响,该影响受限于地区经济实力而存在双重门槛效应。第三,婚姻匹配竞争是房价持续上涨的重要原因。经济落后地区、中游地区和发达地区,住房传递男性质量信息的信号功能依次增强,婚姻匹配竞争对住房价格的刺激作用越来越大。研究结论为市场运行规律剖析、房价分化原因探索以及调控政策的差异化制定等提供了科学的参考和崭新的思路。

Whether we can reveal the root cause of rising housing prices is the key to scientific management and effective regulation.Based on the signaling model,the paper demonstrates the principle of marriage matching competition on housing market through the description of decisionmaking for marriageable population.On this basis,a quantitative analysis of the relationship between marriage matching competition and the housing market in 31 provinces (municipalities,autonomous regions)from 2007 to 2016 is conducted using the panel threshold model.The results show that:firstly,the marriage matching competition is the source of "mother-in-law economy"; secondly,the marriage matching competition has a significant non-linear effect on the housing market.The impact is limited by economic strength of the region and there is a double threshold effect; thirdly,the marriage matching competition is an important reason for the continuous rise of housing prices.In economically underdeveloped areas,medium-developed areas,and developed areas,the signal function of housing which delivers male quality information is enhanced in turn,and the effects of marriage matching competition on housing prices are increasing.The conclusions provide scientific references and new ideas for analysis of market operation rules,exploration of the housing prices differentiation and differential formulation of control policies.