两权分离、金融发展与公司债券限制性条款——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Control-cash Flow Rights Divergence,Financial Development and Corporate Bond Restrictive Covenants:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

本文以2008～2016年中国上市公司发行的公司债为研究样本,采用Poisson模型实证检验了控制权与现金流量权的分离度、金融发展与公司债券限制性条款之间的关系。研究发现:(1)终极控制股东的控制权与现金流量权分离度越高,公司债券限制性条款越多。(2)金融发展越好,公司债券限制性条款越少。(3)良好的金融发展会削弱终极控制股东控制权与现金流量权的分离度与公司债券限制性条款之间的正相关关系。(4)在两权分离度较高的公司中,管理者不倾向使用约束自身经营决策的限制性条款,而更愿意使用对管理人员经营决策不产生影响,但会减少债券投资者实质损失的限制性条款。

Based upon the research sample of Chinese listed firms from 2008 to 2016,this paper adopts Poisson model to examine the effect of control-cash flow rights divergence,the financial development,and their interaction on corporate bond restrictive covenants in China.We find that wider control-cash flow rights divergence is associated with more bond covenants. In contrast,better financial development is associated with fewer bond contracts.Moreover,we find that the positive relation between control-cash flow rights divergence and the number of corporate bond covenants is weakened for firms operating within better financial development.Finally,the managers in firms with wider control-cash flow rights divergence are unwilling to use bond covenants which will restrict their business decisions,but are more willing to use bond covenants which will not influence their decisions but can reduce the losses of bondholders.