环境规制、政治关联丧失与企业创新效率

Environmental Regulation, Loss of Political Connections and Companies' Innovation Efficiency

面对环境规制的巨大压力和政治关联丧失的现实,企业在创新方面的改变值得关注。以2012—2016年沪深A股上市制造业企业为样本,采用双重差分和三重差分法研究新环保法实施与官员独立董事辞职的双重背景下,环境规制与政治关联丧失对企业创新效率的影响。结果发现:环境规制有利于企业创新效率提高,支持波特假说;但是新环保法的颁布却削弱环境规制对创新效率的激励作用;官员独立董事的辞职对政治关联丧失企业的创新效率产生显著的负面影响,并且对民营制造业企业的影响更大,但对国有制造业企业没有显著影响;在双重背景下,两者的共同作用使企业创新效率表现更差,但这只表现在国有制造业企业中,在全样本和民营制造业企业样本中并不明显。研究结论为在环保的发展理念下,政企关系变化影响企业创新提供了理论依据。

Faced with the tremendous pressure of environmental regulation and the loss of political connections,changes of innovation in companies deserve our attention. In the context of the implementation of the new environmental protection law and the resignation of independent directors with government background, this paper, using difference-in-differences model and triple difference model, studied the impacts of environmental regulation and the loss of political connections on companies’ innovation efficiency on the basis of the data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed manufacturing companies from 2012 to 2016. It found that the environmental regulation is conducive to improving companies’ innovation efficiency, supporting the Porter hypothesis. However, the promulgation of the new law has weakened the incentive effect of the regulation on innovation efficiency. The resignation of independent directors has a significant negative impact on companies’ innovation efficiency when they lost their political connections, and a greater impact on private manufacturing companies but no significant effect on state-owned manufacturing companies. In this dual context, the combined effect of environmental regulation and the loss of political connections worsened SOE’innovation efficiency, but not obviously in the whole sample and private manufacturing companies sample. It concluded that this study provided a theoretical basis for the change of the relationship between government and companies in corporate innovation with the application of a new concept of environmental protection.