政府和社会资本合作项目优惠政策的有效性——基于三方博弈动态不一致性视角

The Effectiveness of Preferential Policy of PPP:Based on a Dynamic Consistency Analysis of Tripartite Game

政府与社会资本合作(PPP)模式是一个长期动态的博弈、合作过程,优惠政策的动态不一致性问题更为明显。政策的时滞与缺乏可信性等因素可能影响政策有效性、资源配置效率。结合PPP最为典型的参与结构,构建了三方博弈的动态一致性模型来分析动态一致性问题对优惠政策有效性的影响。研究表明,政府政策的承诺时间是影响PPP优惠政策有效性的重要因素,"信守承诺"型政府在PPP项目初期就制定优惠政策是有效的。政府在制定PPP优惠政策时,必须要将社会资本未来的预期与反应纳入到政策考量中,更加注重政策的稳定性。政府在制定政策时需要在规则和灵活性之间进行权衡,优化政策执行战略,切实维护政府信誉,稳定社会资本预期。

PPP is a long-term dynamic game and cooperation process,ana me dynamic inconsistency of preferential policies is more obvious.Factors such as policy delay and lack of credibility may affect policy effectiveness and resource allocation efficiency.In this paper,we use the time inconsistency model and the most typical tripartite participation structure of PPPs to construct the dynamic consistency model of the three-party game to analyze the effect of dynamic consistency problem on the PPP"s preferential policies.The study shows that the commitment time of government policy is an important factor."Commitment"government is effective in formulating preferential policies in the early stage of PPP project,and the preferential policies of "camera choice"type government will meet inconsistent problem.The public and private sector game more frequently and directly in PPPs,so time inconsistency issues are more pronounced.Therefore,to avoid time inconsistency,when making preferential policies of PPPs,the government should take the private sector's future expectations and reactions into considerations,and to pay more attention to policy stability.In formulating policies, improve policy implementation strategies,effectively maintain pectations. the government needs to balance rules and flexibility, government credibility and stabilize social capital expectations.