P2P保险的道德风险问题研究

Research on the Moral Hazards of P2P Insurance

伴随信息产业的快速发展和互联网保险的广泛运用,近几年来国际上出现了一种新型保险模式――P2P保险(Peer to Peer Insurance)。该模式基于互联网,通过聚集若干风险类型相似的投保人组建风险共担互助小组,风险互助小组成员间一般是亲戚、朋友等熟人关系。P2P保险形成的相互监督机制和声誉机制,可以较好地解决传统保险市场中存在的道德风险问题。本文利用经济学中的比较静态分析方法,研究了P2P保险的道德风险问题,并从理论上证明了在P2P保险模式下,投保人会倾向于更加努力防范风险以降低出险概率,道德风险问题可以得到有效缓解。

With the rapid development of information industry and the wide application of Internet insurance,for recent years,a new type of insurance mode-P2 P Insurance( Peer to Peer Insurance) has emerged in the world.This model is based on the Internet,through gathering a number of policyholders with similar risks to set up risksharing group. Members of risk support group are usually relatives,friends or acquaintances. Mutual supervision mechanism and reputation mechanism formed by P2 P insurance can solve the moral hazard problem in the traditional insurance market. In this paper,using the comparative static analysis method in economics,we study the problems of moral hazard of P2 P insurance and prove theoretically that under the P2 P insurance mode,the policyholder tends to guard against the risk to reduce the risk probability,and the moral hazard problems can be effectively alleviated.