食品安全可追溯与可追责的理论与仿真模拟

The Combined Effect and Mechanism of Traceability and Liability on Food Safety Regulation

通过加强对违法企业的惩处力度建立最严格的食品安全监管制度成为我国食品安全监管新的改革方向,单纯加大处罚力度可否完全发挥威慑企业违法行为的效用?本文通过构建一个包括消费者与上下游企业的食品供应链模型研究发现,对违法企业进行追责的事后监管需要与可追溯体系相互配合,而可追溯体系的关键是其完整性,同时通过基于代理的仿真模拟(ABM)对理论模型进行实证验证,从维持企业存续盈利及降低食品安全事故率的双重角度检验了可追溯与可追责的复合作用,揭示了在食品质量安全控制中惩罚力度与惩罚准确度相辅相成的内在逻辑,最终提出完善整个供应链可追溯体系,以提高对企业追溯的成功率激励企业、保障食品质量安全水平的政策建议。

To establish the most stringent food safety regulatory system and cover the whole process by increasing penalties to the illegal enterprise has been the new direction of food safety regulation reform in China.Can we deter the enterprises to break the law just by increasing penalties?This paper has constructed a food supply chain model including consumers,upstream and downstream enterprises.And the research shows that the ex-post regulation by punishing the illegal enterprise needs to cooperate with traceability system in order to function well.And we verify that theoretical conclusion empirically by an agent-based model,and examine the combined effect of traceability and liability from two respectives.Finally,we recommend that it’s a better way to complete the food safety traceability system covering the whole food chain and improve the probability of successful traceability in order to be an incentive to up and down enterprises and advance the quality and safety of food.