名牌产品企业环境管理下的供应商减排行为演化研究

Research on Emission Reduction Behavior of Suppliers Considering Famous-brand Product Enterprise's Environmental Management

研究名牌产品企业在掌握零部件采购的定价权时对供应商的环境管理策略。构建供应商、名牌产品企业和消费者参与的计算实验模型,通过多主体建模的计算机实现,得到不同减排补贴力度和采购量分配规则下的供应商减排行为和主体收益的演化规律。计算实验结果显示,名牌产品企业的环境管理能够对供应商的减排行为产生重要的影响;采购量分配和减排补贴是名牌产品企业推动供应商减排的两种有效手段;当掌握零部件采购的定价权时,名牌产品企业在依据减排表现分配采购量的基础上,进一步实施减排补贴,通过设置合理的补贴力度能够既推动供应商提高减排水平又增加供应链主体收益。

In this work,we explore famous-brand product enterprise’s environmental management strategy of suppliers’ when they decide the purchase price of components. We established a heterogeneous agent-based computational experiments model consisting of suppliers,consumers and a famous-brand product enterprise. By realizing the model with computer,this paper then explored the evolution trajectory of suppliers’ emission reduction behavior and income of supply chain members under the influence of famous-brand product enterprise’s different subsidies and order decision rules. The experimental results showed that famous-brand product enterprise’s environmental management has a significant influence on emission reduction behavior of suppliers. Order allocation and environmental subsidy are two effective environmental management strategies. When grasping the pricing power of components,famous-brand product enterprise decides orders according to environmental performance of suppliers and implements subsidy further. A reasonable subsidy could simulate suppliers to reduce emissions and also increase income of supply chain members.