基于广告主内生努力水平的付费搜索拍卖研究

Research on Sponsored Search Auction Based on Advertisers' Endogenous Effort

引入广告主内生努力水平,在搜索引擎设置保留价的付费拍卖规则下,采用两阶段博弈模型研究了广告主最优努力水平和均衡竞价策略,并探索了广告主数量和搜索引擎保留价对广告主竞价及努力决策的影响。进一步探究了搜索引擎的最优保留价策略和最大化收益。最后,通过数值算例分析了广告主最优努力水平以及搜索引擎最优保留价和收益,并对相关结论进行了验证和扩展分析。

Based on the reserve price of search engine in sponsored search auction rules,this paper considers the advertisers'endogenous effort and establishes a two-stage game model to study the optimal effort level and equilibrium bidding strategies of the advertisers.Moreover,it explores how the number of advertisers and the search engine's reserve price affect advertisers'decisions on efforts and bidding strategies.After that,further research on the optimal reserve price strategy of search engine and the maximum revenue is displayed.Finally,numerical examples are used to analyze the advertisers'optimal effort level and the search engine's optimal reserve price,as well as the maximum revenue of search engine.With these numerical examples,the relevant conclusions are verified and extended.