摘要
地方政府之间的竞争推动地方经济发展,也造成了资源配置效率下降,因此为了深入贯彻"创新驱动战略、提高全要素生产效率、推动中国经济高质量发展",需要对地方政府过度竞争造成的生产效率损失进行研究。本文利用我国284个地级以上城市的数据研究政府竞争压力对地方生产率的影响,研究发现:第一,地方政府竞争压力对地区生产效率损失的影响呈现正相关关系,对地方生产效率有显著的抑制作用。第二,地方政府的竞争压力对地方生产率损失的影响效应存在较显著的地区差异,一二线城市竞争压力带来的地方效率损失明显高于普通地市。第三,破除经济政绩观将会显著降低辖区内经济效率损失,随着环境与民生政绩指标权重的持续增加,地方政府官员竞争对地方生产率损失的影响呈现先增后减的倒U型结构。
Based on the theory of "Official Promotion Tournament",this paper uses data from 284 cities to study the impact of government competition pressure on local productivity.The results show that:Firstly,the competition pressure level of local government officials has a positive correlation with the loss of regional production efficiency,and has a significant inhibitory effect on local productivity.Secondly,there are significant regional differences on the effect of local productivity loss,the productivity efficiency loss caused by the first and second tier cities is significantly higher than that of the other cities.The comprehensive assessment on the government performance will significantly reduce the loss of productivity efficiency.With the increasing weight of environmental and people's livelihood performance indicators,the impact of local government competition on local productivity loss presents an inverted U-shaped relationship.
作者
李长青
禄雪焕
逯建
LI Chang-qing;LU Xue-huan;LU Jian(School of InternationalBusiness,Southwestern University of Finance 'and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China;Centre for CEE and Balkan Studies,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China;School of economics,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China)
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第12期87-94,共8页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71503207)
西南财经大学中央高校项目"地方官员晋升压力对地区生产效率损失的影响"
关键词
地方政府竞争
生产效率损失
官员晋升锦标赛
local government competition
production efficiency loss
official promotion tournament