三种认知标志理论及其原生意向性难题

Three Theories on the Mark of the Cognitive and Their Problems of Original Intentionality

延展心灵论题主张认知与心灵并非限定于头脑之内,而是延展到了世界之中。这一论题的根本争议在于如何界定认知的标志。围绕这一争议,出现了三种认知标志理论:亚当斯和相泽的非衍生内容理论、梅纳瑞的表征三元体理论和罗兰兹的认知所有权理论。本文发现,三种理论分别诉诸了三种原生意向性观念:内禀意向性、规范意向性和现象意向性,并将其作为认知的标志。然而,三种原初意向性要么不能说明规范性的来源,要么缺乏自然主义的根基,要么无法解释现象特征。为了对克服三种原生意向性的缺陷,并为延展心灵论题提供更有力的支持,本文基于生成主义的理论,倡议了一种生成意向性的观念。

The extended mind thesis asserts that cognition and mind are not only located in the head but extended to the world.The ultimate controversy of this thesis is how to define the mark of the cognitive.There have been three theories of the mark of the cognitive:Adams and Aizawa's non-derived content theory,Menary's representational triad theory and Rowlands's cognitive ownership theory.This paper discovers that the three theories respectively resort to three kinds of original intentionality:intrinsic intentionality,norm intentionality,and phenomenal intentionality,and regard them as the mark of the cognitive,respectively.However,the three kinds of original intentionality either fail to explain the sources of normativity,or lack naturalistic foundations,or are unable to account for phenomenal character.In order to overcome the deficiencies of the three kinds of original intentionality,this article proposes enactive intentionality,which could provide a solid foundation for the extended mind thesis.