资金约束背景下反向保理的供应链合作

Supply Chain Cooperation in Reverse Factoring when Capital Constraints

反向保理通过运用买方(核心企业)优良信誉解决卖方融资难问题。考虑核心企业因为反向保理而承担信誉损失风险的情形,刻画面临不确定需求时由单供应商和单零售商组成的二级供应链系统,建立供应商资金约束背景下基于批发价契约的博弈模型,探讨反向保理情形下的供应链合作,并通过模型演算和数值实验为供应商提供反向保理决策依据。研究发现:当供应商资金约束时,反向保理增加供应链收益,且核心企业受益更多;反向保理能增强供应链运营稳定性和捕捉机会的能力;研究意外发现了供应商和零售商同时受益于优惠的融资条件因而具有加强合作的动力。研究揭示了买方驱动融资的动机并为金融增强供应链合作提供新的支撑。

Reverse factoring solves the seller’s financing difficulty by using the good reputation of the buyer.In practice,core enterprises such as Carrefour China carry out a strategic cooperation on reverse factoring with financial institutions to ease the plight of suppliers and reduce the risk of supply disruptions.Previous studies usually explore the impact of reverse factoring on supply-side operational decisions which are finance-oriented.However,as a buyer-driven financing mode,will the relationship between the upstream and downstream affect the supply chain decision-making in reverse factoring?In addition,for commercial credits turning into bank credits,the core enterprises does not get financing but their credit risk increases in the reverse factoring.So what is the motivates of core enterprise to lead reverse factoring?In this paper,a two-level supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer facing stochastic demand is studied,and a game model is established based on the wholesale price contract to explore the operating rules of financing-constrained supply chain under reverse factoring.The credit risk loss coefficient A/l(where Arepresents the credit risk of the supplier and l represents the total amount of credit of retailer).They are introduced to describe the credit losses suffered by retailers because of credit transfer.By solving the Stackelberg game model inversely,the quantitative decision of reverse factoring in supply chain is obtained:When η≥Q*Nc,the supply chain has sufficient funds and the optimal order quantity is Q*N.When η<Q*Nc,supplier’s funding constraints,in this situation,when {η|p∫Q*2ηc xf(x)dx+l/Aη=}0≤η<Q*Nc,supply chain is not necessary to reverse factoring,the optimal order quantity isη/c;and when {η<η|p∫Q*2ηc xf(x)dx+l/Aη=0},reverse factoring is the best choice and the optimal order quantity is Q*2.Combined with numerical simulation,it is found that reverse factoring can enhance supply chain cooperation and plays an important role in increasing the supply chain participants’ income,enhancing the stability of supply chain operations and the ability of supply chain to capture market opportunities.Furthermore,it is revealed that retailers can benefit more from reverse factoring,which explains the motivation of buyer-driven financing from the perspective of supply chain performance,and provides new support for the opinion of financial strengthening supply chain cooperation.