真理、理智与冒犯情感

Truth, Reason and the Sentiment of Offense

在齐克果的著作中,"冒犯"指称着个体在真理认识活动中出现的一种情感。按照《哲学片段》中的分析,理智在追求真理时陷入了一种严重的认识困境:理智感到了冒犯。这是一种在冒犯中与真理僵持较劲的认识论状态。在《致死的疾病》中,齐克果还从意志的角度分析了冒犯在困境中的不同表现。依据齐克果的相关文本,真理认识者的冒犯情感可归纳为三种表现方式:理智的自弃、理智的迟疑和理智的反抗。在齐克果看来,真理认识这个理性活动是冒犯这种情感所推动的。真理认识和理智冒犯之间的这种内在关系,充分展示了情感在真理认识中的重要作用。

The term of offense in Kierkegaard's works expresses a dynamic element in one's truth seeking.In Philosophical Fragments,Kierkegaard reveals a dilemma that reason encounters in one's pursuit of truth, that is,reason is offended.This is a stalemated epistemological state with truth.In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard analyzes the three expressions of the offense of one's will in relation to the dilemma.This paper analyzes into these three expressions,which are the self-negation of Reason,the hesitation of Reason,and the self-reliant of Reason;and conclude that,according to Kierkegaard,the rational seeking for truth is essentially driven by the offense.The intrinsic relation between truth seeking and reason's offense demonstrates that sentiments plays a vital role in epistemology.