社会责任强制披露下管理层机会主义行为考察——基于A股上市公司的经验证据

Management opportunistic behavior in the compulsory disclosure of corporate social responsibility: Empirical evidence base on A share listed companies

企业社会责任披露的经济后果一直是近年来理论界研究的焦点.在强制性披露社会责任报告的上市公司中,管理层对社会责任报告第三方鉴证的自愿选择权反映其机会主义动机,本文尝试切入企业违规风险的视野,考察管理层机会主义行为的经济后果.研究结果表明,从影响效应看,社会责任强制披露与企业未来期违规风险呈现出显著正相关关系,进一步分析表明,在未进行第三方鉴证的公司中,社会责任强制披露与企业未来期违规风险呈显著正相关,而在自愿进行第三方鉴证的公司中两者间不相关.从作用机理看,社会责任披露对企业未来期违规风险的影响渠道主要来自于管理层代理成本,而不是大股东代理成本和信息环境.从治理因素看,内部控制质量和机构投资者持股比例均未对上述管理层机会主义行为形成显著的治理监督效应.本文在理论上为社会责任强制披露的经济后果提供了直接的证据支持,在实践上为监管部门优化社会责任强制披露以及鼓励社会责任报告第三方鉴证等制度安排提供了重要的决策依据.

From the perspective of firm violation risk,this paper analyzes the objective phenomenon,mechanism and governance factors of management opportunism in the process of compulsory disclosure of corporate social responsibility.First,it is found that there is a significant positive relationship between the compulsory disclosure of social responsibility and the violation tendency of the enterprises in the future period,and this positive relationship only exists in firms with compulsory disclosure or third-party assurance.Secondly,an investigation of the impact mechanism shows that the compulsory disclosure of social responsibility is positively related to the agency cost of management,which indicates that mandatory disclosure of social responsibility can cause management opportunism.Finally,it is found that internal control quality and institutional investors' shareholding do not have significant governance effect on managers'opportunistic be-havior in the compulsory disclosure of social responsibility.This paper provides evidence for the effect of the mandatory disclosure of social responsibility and provides support for improvement of third-party assurance of the mandatory disclosure of social responsibility in practice.