借贷能力、风险收益与新型农业经营主体经营效率

Credit Ability,Risk Income and the Operating Efficiency of New Agricultural Business Entities

通过构建一个新型农业经营主体与金融组织讨价还价的理论模型,在纳什议价均衡的基础上分析新型经营主体最优产出水平与其借贷能力、风险收益的关系。基于中国12省的微观调查数据,采用双边随机边界检验,对理论模型进行了实证研究,结果表明:借贷能力不足是新型经营主体经营无效率的主导因素,最终使平均净效率下降了8.13%;正规金融机构和民间借贷均对新型经营主体的经营效率有显著影响,并且民间借贷对经营效率的影响更强;新型经营主体的负责人能力、盈利能力、组织化程度等,与其经营效率呈正相关关系。提出应通过金融体系创新、完善民间借贷法规等途径,降低新型农业经营主体的融资约束,提高其负责人的经营水平,加强新型经营主体的组织化程度。

Based on the equilibrium of the Nash program,this paper builds a theoretical bargaining model between the new agricultural business entities(NABE)and the financial organization so as to explore the relationship among credit ability,risk income and optimal output of the NABE.An empirical stduy is conducted by using the survey data from 12 provinces in China via a Two-tier Stochastic Frontier Model.The results show that:(1)Lack of credit ability is the dominant factor for the inefficiency of the NABE,resulting in an average net efficiency decline of 8.13%;(2)Both formal financial institutions and private lending have a significant impact on the operational efficiency of the NABE,and the impact of private lending is stronger;(3)The ability of the manager,profitability,and the compactness of organizing are positively correlated with the efficiency of the NABE.Finally,this paper proposes that various means should be used to reduce the financing constraints of the NABE,such as the financial system innovation,improving rules and regulations for private lending,improving the management ability of the person in charge,and strengthening the organizing of the NABE.