国有企业的扩张行为:动机及效应

The Expansion Behavior of State-owned Enterprises:Motivation and Effects

文章通过建立国企的效用最大化的目标函数,揭示其包含了来自市场激励和政府激励的多元化目标,其中规模最大化是效用最大化的最近似的可量化目标,其能够包括并同时满足国企追求的其它效用目标。本文表明了国企持续超常的规模扩张是建立在长期高额负债率和利润率显著低下的基础上,证实了国企不仅缺乏融资约束,也缺乏市场竞争约束。由于这两个基本约束的软化,导致企业过度膨胀,超过了正常合理水平。由于规模庞大且层级结构复杂,还会加剧了企业的难以监控的"黑箱"行为。这种机制可能诱发腐败,还导致一系列不良效应,包括产能过剩,僵尸企业,垄断势力强化,企业成本剧增等等。对于市场约束的缺位,合理的解决路径是加强市场约束,而不是加强行政约束。改革的选择方向是,实行分类改革,对于面向市场的企业,需要在利益相关者之间通过合理契约来实现市场激励和约束。

By establishing the objective function of maximizing the utility of SOE,this paper reveals that it contains diversified goals from market incentives and government incentives,in w hich the maximization of scale is the most basic goal of SOE,because it can simultaneously meet their other utility goals. Using statistical description,this paper show s that the scale expansion of SOE is based on the long-term high debt ratio and the significant low profit margin,and confirme that SOE not only lack financing constraints,but also lack the basic market competition constraints. Due to its large scale and complex hierarchical structure,SOE exacerbates the "black box " behavior that is difficult to monitor. This mechanism not only produces corruption,but also induce some irrational effects,including overcapacity, zombie companies, the strengthening of monopoly pow er, and raising corporate costs. Ow ing to lack of market restraint,a reasonable solution path is to strengthen market constraints rather than strengthen administrative constraints. The choice and direction of reform needs to clearly define the boundaries of property rights,making reasonable contracts to achieve incentive among the stakeholders.