模态怀疑论可以被消除吗?

Can Modal Skepticism be Eliminated?

范·因瓦根(van Inwagen)是温和的模态怀疑论的拥护者。他认为,我们只能获取对某些模态陈述——普通模态陈述——的知识(或辩护);但是对于特殊模态陈述,我们无法获得关于它们的知识(或辩护)。特别地,范·因瓦根认为,可设想性作为认知手段无法使得我们获得关于后者的知识(或辩护)。但是,范·因瓦根的理论缺陷有两点:首先,他没有对"特殊模态陈述"这个概念给出精确的刻画;其次,他只论证了模态怀疑论在亚布罗(Stephen Yablo)的可设想性理论框架内成立,而亚布罗的理论并不是最精致的。所以,即便模态怀疑论在粗糙的理论体系下成立,它是否能在更精致的可设想性理论体系中成立尚未可知。文章提供了一个关于特殊模态陈述的定义,并证明即便在查莫斯(David Chalmers)的可设想性理论的框架下,模态怀疑论也无法消除。

Van Inwagen is a proponent of moderate modal skepticism. In his view,we can only acquire knowledge (or defense) of a kind of statements,that is,ordinary modal statements. There is another kind of modal statements--extraordinary modal statements which we can never know or justify. Specially,he believes that we cannot know or have justification of the latter via conceivability. However,Van Inwalgen’s theory has two shortcomings: first,the notion "extraordinary modal statements"is not well-defined;second,he just shows that modal skepticism is true within Yablo’s framework,which is not the most sophisticated one on conceivability. Hence,even if moderate modal skepticism is established in a rough theoretical system,it is still underdetermined whether it can be established in a more elaborate system of conceivability. In this paper,I aim to provide a definition of the notion "extraordinary modal statements"and show that van Inwagen’s modal skepticism holds even within Chalmers’ framework of conceivability.