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商业保险在供应链质量风险管理中的应用研究 被引量:8

The application of business insurance into the management of quality risks in supply chain
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摘要 实践中,制造商可通过商业保险策略降低因零部件质量问题造成的经济损失.然而,商业保险购买成本较高且可能导致供应商轻视质量问题,放弃质量改进.为此,本文基于完全信息下单周期两级供应链的采购合约决策模型,研究制造商如何利用商业保险管理供应链质量风险的问题.通过比较研究,找出商业保险策略的实施条件,并给出最优采购合约及商业保险策略.研究结果表明:(1)当供应商的企业规模较小、抗风险能力较低时,商业保险策略可完全消除风险承受能力对双方交易的制约,促进双方达成交易;(2)当供应商的企业规模较大、抗风险能力较高时,制造商可利用商业保险策略降低零部件采购价格,提高期望利润;(3)在商业保险策略下,制造商的最优商业保险策略是全额投保;(4)商业保险的实施不一定造成零部件质量水平的下降.当质量成本或供应商的风险承受能力较低时,商业保险策略与质量改进之间具有互补效应.当风险承受能力和质量成本均比较高时,商业保险策略与质量改进之间具有替代效应. In practice,the manufacturer can control the supplier's quality by means of business insurance, hence reducing the potential business loss induced by component defects.However,the cost of business insurance is relatively high,which may lead suppliers to despise the seriousness of quality problems,and then abandon quality improvement.Based on a procurement contract decision model of two-echelon supply chains in single period under complete information,this paper studies how the manufacturer can take advantage of business insurance to manage the quality risk of supply chains.By comparing the manufacturer's profits under the no-insurance strategy with that under business insurance strategy,it aims to explore the implementation conditions of the business insurance strategy,and gives the optimal purchase contract and the business insurance strategy:The results show that :(1)If the supplier is small in size and poor in anti-risk capacity,the business insurance strategy can eliminate the constraints of risk tolerance on transactions of the two parties and promote transactions;(2)If the supplier is large in size and strong in anti-risk capacity,the manufacturer can take advantage of business insurance strategy to reduce the purchase price of components and to raise the expected profits;(3)The optimal strategy for the manufacturer is to insure for the full value if it insures;(4)The implementation of business insurance does not necessarily lead to a decline in component quality.When the quality cost or the supplier's risk tolerance is relatively low,there is a complementary effect between business insurance strategy and quality improvement.When both the risk tolerance and the quality cost are high,there is a substitution effect between business insurance strategy and quality improvement.
作者 陈静 魏航 谢磊 CHEN Jing;WEI Hang;XIE Lei(School of Business Administration,Shandong Technology and Business University,Shandong 264005,China;College of Business,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第1期80-93,共14页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272016 71571114) 山东工商学院博士启动基金资助项目(BS201725)
关键词 供应链质量风险管理 商业保险 质量改进 风险规避 采购合约 product quality risk management business insurance quality improvement risk aversion procurement contract
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