上市公司并购重组中对赌契约对并购绩效的影响——基于北京光线传媒并购重组案例研究

The Influence of Valuation Adjustment Mechanism on M&A Performance——Based on the M&A of Beijing Enlight Media Co. Ltd.

全国中小企业股份转让系统规定"挂牌公司应当在股票发行情况报告书中完整披露认购协议中的特殊条款",表明对赌契约已经成为我国资本市场重要的金融工具,同时也表明对赌契约具有高风险性。本文基于上市公司北京光线传媒并购重组的案例,利用事件分析法和财务分析法分析在并购重组中上市公司制定的对赌契约对并购绩效构成的影响。结果发现在北京光线传媒并购重组中对赌契约没有对并购绩效产生正向的影响,反而使企业损失惨重。建议上市公司在并购重组中应当在了解宏观经济环境与风险的前提下,尽量准确对目标企业进行价值评估,依据风险大小决定业绩补偿条款;同时,应当谨慎对赌、谨慎并购,在采取重大决策前可以采取先试探后决定的方式,避免过高风险。

The national system for the transfer of shares of small and medium-sized enterprises stipulates that the listed company shall fully disclose the special terms and conditions of its subscription agreement in its stock issue report. It means that Valuation Adjustment Mechanism(VAM) has become an important financial tool in China capital market and it has high-risk features. Based on the M&A of Beijing Enlight Media Co.Ltd., this paper makes event-study analysis and financial analysis to illustrate the influence of VAM on M&A performance. The author finds that the former did not has a positive influence on the latter. On the contrary, the VAM has caused the enterprise to suffer heavy losses. This paper suggests that the listed company should firstly have a full understanding of the macroeconomic environment and risks before making an accurate evaluation of the target enterprise and determine performance compensation terms based on the size of risks. The listed company must be very prudent in building valuation adjustment mechanism and in its M&A business. Before making a major decision, the company can take a tentative approach to avoid excessive risks.