国有上市公司内部薪酬差距的十年演变及激励效应跟踪

The Ten Year’s Transition of State-Owned Listed Firms Internal Pay Gap and Incentive Effects Tracing

国企内部薪酬差距的制定涉及国有资产运营效率与社会公平间的权衡。本文以2007年之前在沪深两市上市的792家国有公司为样本,研究发现:国家薪酬管制政策对高管团队薪酬差距、高管员工薪酬差距和高管薪酬最大值具有扼制作用;扩大高管团队薪酬差距会引发社会比较效应,扩大高管员工薪酬差距未形成锦标赛激励作用。未来国企薪酬制度设计有必要保持对内部薪酬差距的控制,注意平衡高管之间薪酬分布和权责配置的关系,关注高管团队凝聚力的培养。

The internal pay gap in state-owned listed firms involves the trade-off between the operating efficiency of state-owned assets and social fairness. This paper uses 792 state-owned firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen securities exchanges before 2007 as research samples, finds that the series compensation regulation policies have restraining effects on the pay gap in executives team, the pay gap between senior executives and employees and the maximum value of executives pay. Broadening the pay gap in executives team will trigger the social comparative effects, and broadening the pay gap between senior executives and employees never have the tournament incentive effects. In the future process of state-owned firms pay system design, we should continuously keep the control on the internal pay gaps, balance the relationship between pay distribution and the configuration of power and responsibility among executives, and should think highly of the cultivation of executives team cohesive force.