现象概念策略与控制论证

The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and the Master Argument

现象概念策略被认为是物理主义应对以解释鸿沟为代表的反物理主义理论最具希望的路径,而查默斯则试图利用控制论证证明任何版本的现象概念策略都无法同时完成其保持物理上可解释性和解释我们有关意识的认知形势的理论任务。物理主义立场的反驳虽然试图从多个角度削弱控制论证,却因无法避免地涉及诸多双方难以达成共识的争议问题,也难以为反对者所接纳。而通过分析控制论证自身论证形式中的逻辑问题,能够在较为不涉立场争议的情况下缓解控制论证为现象概念策略带来的理论压力,使其继续为填补解释鸿沟而发挥作用。

The phenomenal concept strategy is considered to be the most promising physicalist defence against problems raised by anti-physicalist arguments like the explanatory gap,yet David Chalmers attempts to argue that any version of this strategy cannot manage to simultaneously accomplish its theoretical obligations - maintaining physically explicable and explaining our epistemic situation of consciousness. Although the refutation from the physicalist side works on weaken the master argument from multiple angles,it is hardly acceptable for Chalmers because of the controversial issues inevitably involved. By analysing the logical problems in the master arguments,we try to ease the theoretical pressure of phenomenal concept strategy caused by it without touching upon any controversial issues between the two sides,in the hope that the phenomenal concept strategy could continue its work in deflating the explanatory gap in consciousness studies.