基于信号传递博弈的“雨露计划”扶贫补贴机制治理

The Investigation of the Poverty-alleviating in Yulu Project Based on Signaling Game

以我国"雨露计划"中出现的扶贫造假问题为切入点,以信号传递博弈模型为手段,对我国当前正在实施的"雨露计划"扶贫补贴机制进行了探讨。研究发现:学校扶贫造假行为的产生与其造假成本、造假风险概率和造假风险成本等因素密切相关;当学校通过造假获取的补贴收益小于其诚实申请补贴的收益时,"雨露计划"中的扶贫造假行为将会从根本上被消除。若要走出"雨露计划"的扶贫补贴困境,实现教育扶贫资源的优化配置,政府应着重考虑:提高扶贫造假成本;加大监察力度;加大扶贫造假处罚力度;提高扶贫补贴发放信息公开程度。

Focusing on problems of false poverty-alleviation happened in Chinese Yulu Project,signaling game model is used to analyze the project’s subsidy mechanism in this paper.Results show that:first,the false activity of the schools is related to the false cost,the probability of fraud risk and the false risk cost.Second,when the schools’revenue though false to gain the high subsidies less than the ones honest to get the low subsidies,the false poverty-alleviating in Yulu Project will be eliminated effectively.Finally,if the government tries to walk out of the dilemma of subsiding for education poverty-alleviation in Yulu Project,and reach the optimal allocation of educational resources,it should consider:enhancing the false cost,enhancing the supervision,throwing heavily punishment to falser,and improving the publish situation of subsidies information for poverty-alleviating.