竞合模式下考虑低碳产品推广补贴的供应链博弈研究

Study on Supply Chain Game Considering Low-Carbon Promotion Subsidy under Cooperation-Competition Model

在制造商向零售商提供低碳产品推广补贴的背景下,考虑一个主导制造商和两个跟随零售商构成的供应链,研究两个零售商竞争与合作情况下的供应链减排及低碳产品推广决策,运用Stackelberg博弈理论分别构建了竞争模式、合作模式的模型,得到最优减排水平、低碳产品推广投入及低碳产品推广成本分摊比例.通过比较分析发现:两种模式的最优减排水平不变;与竞争模式相比,合作模式下零售商低碳产品推广投入更低,利润更大,而制造商分摊比例更大,利润更小;当竞争系数大于两个零售商低碳产品推广敏感系数之和时,整个供应链的利润更高,通过谈判协调,可以提高双方的利润.最后运用算例验证了模型的有效性.

In the context of the manufacturer offering some lowcarbon promotion subsidy to retailers a supply chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and two following retailers is considered research on emission reduction and lowcarbon promotion decision under the condition of competition and cooperation of two retailers,the Stackelberg game theory is used to construct the model of the competition mode and the cooperative mode the optimal level of emission reduction,lowcarbon promotion investment and the proportion of low-carbon promotion costs are obtained.Through the comparative analysis,it is shown that the optimal level of emission reduction of two modes of constant;compared with the competition mode, cooperation mode of retailers low-carbon promotion investment is lower,more profitable,and manufacturer proportion bigger,less profitable;when the coefficient of competition is greater than the sum of the sensitivity coefficient of the two retailers,the whole supply chain has a higher profit through negotiation,can improve the profits of both sides.Finally,a numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the models.