对学生惩罚越重作弊越少吗?

The Heavier Punishment for the Students,the Less Cheating?

对学生与监考老师在考试时作弊与不作弊的混合策略进行分析,从博弈论的角度运用最大期望收益与等收益法对混合策略的纳什均衡进行求解.结果显示,加大学生作弊的惩罚会导致老师监考不严,而对监考老师的奖励或惩罚越大,学生作弊的概率越小.因此,加大监考老师的激励是降低学生作弊的有效方法.根据经济学激励理论对学校与监考老师的博弈进行求解,结果既能满足激励相容约束,又能在学校与监考老师之间的序贯博弈中达到纳什均衡,为建立监考老师的激励机制与防止学生作弊提供了理论依据.

This paper contributes to mixed strategy of the students and the supervisors to cheat and not on the exam during the examination. Mixed Strategies Nash Equilibrium is solved by using the maximum expected payoff and equal payoff method from the perspective of game theory. The results show that increasing the punishment for cheating students will lead to lax supervisor, and the greater the reward or punishment for supervisors, the less likely the students are cheating. Therefore, increasing the incentive of supervisor is an effective method to reduce students’ cheating. According to the economic incentive theory,the game between the school and the teachers of invigilator is solved. The result can not only satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint, but also can achieve Nash equilibrium in the sequential game between the school and the supervisor, which provides a theoretical basis for the establishment of the teacher’s motivation mechanism and the prevention of students cheating.