机构投资者、企业融资约束与超额现金持有

Institutional Investors, Corporate Financing Constraints and Excess Cash Holding

基于我国沪深两市A股上市企业2007—2017年的数据,考察了不同类型机构投资者对上市企业融资约束和超额现金持有的影响。研究结果表明:当上市企业前十大股东中有机构投资者且单家机构投资者持股比例较大,达到1%或以上时,这类机构投资者能够实质性影响企业经营管理决策,可在一定程度上解决信息不对称和代理冲突问题,缓解企业融资约束,并减少企业因预防动机而超额持有的现金;当机构投资者持股比例不大,未进入上市企业前十大股东时,则对公司治理不产生重大影响,对企业融资约束和超额现金持有也无明显影响。机构投资者长期集中持股,有利于其充分参与公司治理,缓解股东和经理人之间的代理问题。

Based on the data of A share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2007 to 2017, this paper explores the impact of institutional investors of different types on the financing constraints of listed enterprises and the excess cash holding. The results show that if there are institutional investors among the top ten shareholders of the listed company and the share holding proportion of one single institutional investor is relatively bigger, reaching more than1% or more, then such institutional investor can have substantial effects on the operation, management and decision marking of the enterprise, which can to a certain extent solve the problems of information asymmetric and agency conflicts, release business financing constraints, and reduce the excess cash holding because of precautionary motive. If institutional investors are not among the top ten shareholders and holding a small amount of stocks, such institutional investors have little effect on corporate governance, and no significant influence is found on the corporate financing constraint and excess cash holding. When institutional investors hold large amount of stocks in a company for a long time, it is in favor of their participation in the corporate governance, so that the agency problem between shareholders and managers can be alleviated.