考虑汇率波动的资金约束跨境供应链融资订购决策

The Pricing Decisions in a Two-echelon Cross-border Capital Constraint Supply Chain under the Exchange Rate Volatility

当前跨境供应链越来越普遍地出现在全球化的商业环境中。通过考虑具有资金约束零售商的两级跨境供应链,零售商能够向第三方金融机构融资实现订购,供应商和零售商处于不同国家。在批发价合同下,依据资金约束零售商订货周期和还贷期限的长短关系,讨论了六种情形下涵盖第三方金融机构的Stackelberg博弈均衡。博弈均衡理论结果显示供应商利润不受汇率波动的影响;当实际汇率高于预期值时,第三方金融机构利润将高于期望利润,零售商利润将低于期望利润。此外,基于汇率波动讨论了供应链参与方的损失概率,提出了供应链参与方在汇率波动加剧时的应对策略。

With the development of the globalization,more and more cross-border supply chains appear in the real-world business.We consider a two-echelon cross-border supply chain with a supplier and a financially constrained retailer,in which both players are in two different countries.The financially constrained retailer funds its business by borrowing from external financial institution to satisfy the market demand.According to the term difference between the order cycle and the loan repayment,with a wholesale price contract we consider six possible business scenarios and solve the equilibria in the Stackelberg game.The analytical solutions show that the exchange rate volatility has no impact on the supplier’s profit.When the actual exchange rate is higher than its expected value,the external financial institution can obtain a greater profit than its expected profit while the retailer only has a smaller profit than its expected profit.In addition,we discuss the loss probability of the player’s profit.We present some meaningful management insights to deal with the exchange rates volatility.