会计信息可比性与高管薪酬契约有效性

Financial Statement Comparability and Executive Compensation Contracting Efficiency

会计信息在高管激励契约中的作用历来是理论与实务中关注的重要问题。本文以2006～2016年我国上市公司为对象,研究会计信息可比性与高管薪酬契约有效性之间的关系,结果发现,会计信息可比性与公司高管薪酬-业绩敏感度之间存在显著正相关关系。与国有企业相比,会计信息可比性对薪酬契约有效性的影响在非国有企业中更为显著。进一步分析发现,会计信息可比性与高管薪酬-业绩敏感度之间的正相关关系在信息复杂程度较高、内部控制质量较差、外部监督较弱的企业中更为显著。总体而言,本文的研究结果表明会计信息可比性特征对薪酬契约有效性具有重要影响。

Based on the sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2016,this paper investigates the relationship between financial statement comparability and executive compensation contracting efficiency.We find that financial statement comparability is positively associated with executives pay-for-performance sensitivity.Comparing to state-owned firms,the effect of comparability is more pronounced in non-state-owned firms.Furthermore,we find that the association between comparability and pay-for-performance sensitivity is more pronounced among firms with complex information,worse internal control and weaker external monitoring.Overall,our evidence suggest that comparability,as one of the major features of accounting information quality,has a significant influence on the efficiency of compensation arrangements.