企业声誉与盈余管理:有效契约观还是寻租观

Corporate Reputation and Earnings Management: Efficient Contract Theory or Rent-Seeking Theory

企业盈余管理行为从根本上反映了会计契约未得到有效执行,本文研究了作为契约执行机制之一的声誉机制对企业盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现,对于实施了正向应计和真实盈余管理的企业,良好的企业声誉能够显著抑制这种盈余管理行为,而对于实施了负向应计和真实盈余管理的企业,良好的企业声誉却能够显著增加这种盈余管理行为。这表明,拥有良好声誉的企业对外报告了更加稳健的盈余信息,符合声誉机制的有效契约观。进一步研究发现,企业声誉对盈余管理的影响是通过高质量审计师的选聘和有效内部控制的实施来实现的。

This paper studies the impact of reputation mechanism as one of the contract enforcement mechanisms on earnings management behavior.This paper finds that,for corporates that implement positive accrual and real earnings management,better corporate reputation can significantly inhibit this kind of earnings management behavior,while for corporates that implement negative accruals and real earnings management,better corporate reputation can significantly increase this kind of earnings management behavior.That means that corporates with better reputation report more conservative earnings information to the users,it comply with the effective contract theory.Further studies also find that,the impact of corporate reputation on earnings management achieved through the selection of high-quality auditors and the effective implementation of internal controls.