摘要
在电力市场环境下 ,发电公司从传统的完成发电任务转变为报价竞标发电负荷以获得最大的利润 ,其目标和行为发生了本质的变化。文中利用博弈论中 n人对策理论 ,对独自竞标和联盟竞标情况下发电公司的行为和市场状况进行了研究。算例表明 ,联盟未必获得更大的利润 ,产权不同是防止市场完全垄断的根本。
In electricity m arket,those power plants belonging to the same generation com pany m ay form an essential coalition.Also,for more profits,generation companies m ay ally in private for bargaining in an electricity market.So it is of vital importance to study such problem s as whether power plants will ally or not,whether the coalition will be stable or not, and how the coalition influence on the whole electricity market.This paper analyzes these problems by using the n- person game m ethod of the game theory.It concludes that coalition does not always result in more profits.
出处
《电力系统自动化》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2002年第5期5-8,共4页
Automation of Electric Power Systems