接管壁垒缺失与国有企业经营者低效更替的发生

Deficiency of Takeover Defense and Inefficient of State-owned Entrepreneur Turnover

接管壁垒是治理结构的一个重要环节 ,它在维护企业家职位稳定性的同时 ,可以防止和减少低效率更替的发生。本文的分析表明 ,在以行政干预下的“内部人”控制为特征的国有企业治理结构中 ,接管壁垒的缺失使企业经营者的更替陷入了“低壁垒 ,高更替 ,低效率”的恶性循环。因此 ,解决领导班子问题必须从治理结构的源头—产权改革开始 ,并为企业家阶层的形成提供金融制度的支持。

Takeover defense is a very important segment of corporate governance, which can maintain the stability of managerial career and reduce the inefficiency turnover. The analysis of our paper will show that under the insider-control system of the Chinese state-owned enterprise, the absence of takeover defense put the managerial replacement into a vicious circle: 'lower defense, higher turnover, lower efficiency.' Therefore , the likely way out for this problem is to reform the property rights, and provides the finance institution support for the emerging of entrepreneur stratum.