信息追随、管理者从众行为与报酬合约

Informational Cascade,Herd Behavior of Manager and Payment Contract

在委托代理框架下分析管理者代理行为 ,忽视了管理者在既定的激励安排下还会表现出一些不以侵害股东利益为代价的消极的机会主义动机 ,如“不求有功 ,但求无过”的动机。本文侧重于其中一种行为 ,即管理者从众行为的分析。主要结论是 ,管理者从众行为实际上是信息追随 ,目的是建立自身的信誉。管理者支付结构变化是改变管理者从众行为的重要因素。避免管理者从众行为的报酬合约 ,应采取由一笔固定报酬、根据企业绩效分享较多的剩余收益和根据决策质量 (创新决策还是信息追随 )确定较高的惩罚金三种支付组成的报酬形式。

The analysis of the manager's agent behavior in the principal-agent framework neglects the fact that under the given incentive arrangement, the manager will still have some opportunist motives which do not offend the interests of the shareholders, such as the motive of 'pursuing not excellency but no faults'. This thesis puts a particular emphasis on one of these activities, namely the herd behavior of the manager. The main conclusion is that the herd behavior of the manager is essentially informational cascade, the aim of which is to build up his reputation. The change of manager's payoff structure is an important factor that changes his herd behavior. To avoid the herd behavior of the manager, a payment contract should consist of three parts, namely a sum of fixed payment, a larger proportion of the residual earnings according to performance of the firm and a high penalty according to the decision quality (innovative decision or informational cascade).