摘要
通过三个博弈模型描述了税收征管博弈的基本情况。主要结论 :一是政府加重对违法纳税人的惩罚会产生积极效果 ,但在长期中却会使征税人产生松懈思想 ;二是提高税务稽查概率是阻止逃税的有效措施 ,但由于存在稽查成本 ,使税务机关不会无限度地提高稽查概率 ;三是反逃税只注重稽查概率一个指标只能治标。治本则需建立反逃税的系统工程。
The present paper,describing the basic situation of the gaming model of tax collection and management through three gaming models,arrives at the following conclusions:1.The heavier punishment to the unlawful tax payers can produce positive effects,but it will make the tax collecters slack in their thoughts;2 lncreasing tax inspection probability is an effective measure to keep from avoidance of tax.Due to the tax checking cost,it is impossible for the tax authorities to increase limitless tax inspection probability;3.To lay stress only on inspection probability is not enough for fighting against tax avoidance.To solve the problem thoroughly,we have to establish a systematic engineering against it.
关键词
税收征管
税务稽查模型
纳什均衡
动态博弈
tax collection and management
tax inspection model
equality of taxation
dynamic gaming
