摘要
在现代股份制企业资本所有者和经营者现实博弈中 ,大量存在的乃是资本所有者和经营者非合作博弈。文章从经理人现实行为偏好选择对这种行为偏离及相应对所有者利益偏差进行了分析 ,并从合作博弈设计角度进行博弈改进 ,这包括解雇威胁收益的设计实施。
In the game between manager and capital owner in moderrn stock company, most of them are non cooperative games In this article, it analyzed two realistic reasons for manager to take non cooperative behaviors, then redesign the game for the purpose of cooperative game, includes increasing the threatening of fire, the design of common gains, and the mechanism of having more information about manager
出处
《广西经济管理干部学院学报》
2002年第2期46-50,共5页
Journal of GuangXi Cadres College of Economic and Management