中国国有工业企业劳动力冗员问题研究

Investigating the Rise of Labor Redundancy in China’s State Industry

科尔奈发展的预算软约束理论提出了一个引人注目的关于国营企业冗员现象的解释。然而这类文献有时忽略这样一种现象，即政府、特别是转型经济中的政府往往会让国有企业（SOEs)追求一些非经济目标，并通过补贴和政策性贷款来为此提供资助。通过对大约700家国有企业的研究，我们发现在不减轻企业社会负担的情况下，预算约束的硬化是直接导致九十年代初中国国企冗员上升的主要原因之一。

Konai's soft budget constraints thesis offers an attractive explanation of over- manning in public enterprises.What is sometimes overlooked in the literature,however,is that governments,especially in transition economies,often use state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to pursue non-financial objectives,financing the resulting social burdens on SOEs with subsidies and policy loans.In studying a panel of about 700 SOEs,we find that the hardening of budget constraints without at the same time relieving SOEs of their social burdens was a major proximate cause of rising redundant labor in early 1990s China.