双寡头的经济捕鱼策略

Two Players′ Economic Harvesting Policy in Fishing Industry

为了实现渔业资源的可持续利用 ,必须合理投入捕捞努力量 .在存在两个捕捞主体的情况下 ,分别就 Cournot模型和 Stackelberg模型分析了两个主体为了自身获得最大持续利润而投入的捕捞努力量 .与只有一个捕捞主体相比 ,当存在两个捕捞主体时 ,每个捕捞主体投入的捕捞努力量将增加或保持不变 ,但每个主体单位捕捞努力量所能取得的纯利润将减少 .产生这种低效率的原因在于每个主体只考虑自己投入的捕捞努力量对自己利润的影响 ,而不考虑对对方或社会产生的负面影响 .对渔业捕捞全面规划、综合管理是消除这种后果所必要的 .

The reasonable fishing effort should be kept in order that the sustainable utilization of fishery resources is realized. Under the assumption that there are two fishing players, this paper studies the problem that how each of them determines his fishing effort in Cournot model and Stackelberg model respectively, with an objective of maximizing his sustainable profit. Compared with one player case, when there are two players, the fishing effort of each player will increase or be invariant, but the maximum sustainable profit that unit fishing effort can get will decrease. Such inefficiency attributes to the fact that every player only considers the positive influence to his yield and ignores the negative influence to his counterpart and the society. It is necessary to put overall planning and management on fishing industry in order to avoid such a result.