转型中的国有企业代理问题及对策

Agency Problem and its Countermeasures in State-Owned Enterprises in Transition

两权分离的现代公司制企业中 ,所有者和经营者形成委托代理关系。经营者在追求自身效用最大化的过程中有可能损害所有者利益 ,从而产生代理问题。国有企业的委托代理关系存在诸多产生代理问题的体制性诱因 ,代理问题较为严重。国有企业的效益欠佳、亏损面较大 ,在很大程度上是代理问题的存在所致。其对策思路是

There is a principal-agent relationship between owners and managers in modern incorporated companies, where ownership and control are separated. Managers may do harm to the interests of owners while seeking for the maximization of their own utility, thus giving rise to the problem of agency. There are many institutional causes in state-owned enterprises that lead to the agency problem. Poor performance and losses incurred in many stated-owned enterprises are, to a great extent, caused by the problem. Its countermeasure is to reconstruct the manager incentive-constraint mechanism.