我国私营企业的非契约融资与控制权转移

Non-Contractual Financing and the Transfer of Control Rights in China's Private Firms

在第一代私营企业主的企业时期,私营企业的融资带有一定的计划经济痕迹,企业在不完全资本市场中的融资具有非契约性,控制权的转移是私营企业第二个生命周期的开始,也是实现融资与治理的契约化的过程。控制权在家族内部的转移是一种成本最小的方式,也是私营企业的首选方式。控制权转移给职业经理的条件是家族治理的成本高于聘请职业经理所发生的代理成本。家族集中持有的财产承担了企业风险和隐性成本,但内源融资使企业对资本周转速度不够敏感,减缓了加速效应,企业难以在短期内迅速获得技术创新和组织创新能力。

When the first generation owners of private firms financed, financing had something to do with the planned economy. Firms financed in the incomplete capital market was non-contractual. The transfer of control rights marks the beginning of the second life cycle of private firms, and is the process of financing and governance by means of contract. Because the transfer of control rights within a family costs the least, private firms prefer it the most. If the costs of family control are higher than the agency costs incurred by bringing in professional management, the control rights will be transferred to professional managers. Owning family undertakes business risks and implicit costs, but internal financing makes the firm less sensitive to the speed of capital turnover, reducing the accelerating effect, thus the firm is hardly to obtain the ability of technological and organizational innovations.