双重成本约束下的最优企业所有权安排——企业共同治理的经济学分析

Optimal Ownership Structure under Agency and Knowledge Costs:An Economic Analysis of Co-governance of the Firm

对企业治理及其最优所有权安排的探讨必须从企业本质的两重属性及其到动的角度动态地考察。从这个角度看，企业手最优所有权安排受到知识成本和代理成本的双重约束。在双重成本约束下，企业所有权的集中与分散对应的结合是企业发展中最优所有权安排的常态。共同治理是企业长期发展和成长的必然选择。

Although co-governance has been pervasive in firm management in the de- veloped countries,the capitalist thesis still dominates the theory of the firm.Transaction cost economics views the firm merely as a set of contracts.Instead,this paper views the firm as a combination of production and contracts.In a dynamic framework,the ownership structure is the result of the dual nature of the firm.Specifically,it is shaped to balance the agency cost that characterizes the contractual nature of the firm and the knowledge cost that characterizes the productive nature of the firm.As a result,co-governance could emerge as the prevailing state of ownership.