摘要
现代企业所有权与经营权的分离 ,使得股东与经理之间形成了委托代理关系 ,在信息不对称的情况下 ,委托人有必要对代理人的行为建立一套激励与约束机制。本文就股权激励机制的可行性与合理性加以探讨 ,通过引入经理的机会集合 ,构造一股东与经理之间的两阶段博弈 ,从而确定一适当的股权激励比例。
The separation of ownership and operation of modern firms builds up a principal-agent relation between stock-holders and managers. Under asymmetric information it is necessary for the principal to set up a mechanism of incentive and constraint for the agent. The paper explores the feasibility and reasonability of stock-based incentive mechanism, through the introduction of the opportunity set of managers, makes up a two-perild game between stock-holders and managers, and works out a proper stock-based incentive ratio.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2002年第3期62-65,共4页
Forecasting
关键词
股权激励
机会集合
效用
约束
stock-based incentive
opportunity set
utility
constraint
