信息不对称条件下风险投资的融资方式研究

Financing Mode for Risk Investment under Information Asymmetry

风险投资的融资市场上 ,存在着严重的信息不对称现象 ,这是它与传统的融资市场的显著区别之一。信息不对称可分为两种 ,即隐藏行为和隐藏信息 ,它们分别会产生道德风险与逆向选择问题。为了最大限度地减少信息不对称的风险 ,应该从风险投资的融资方式设计入手 ,选择合适的融资方式 ,提高风险投资者应对和处理信息不对称的能力。

There is critical information asymmetry in the financial market of risk investment. That is what differs distinctly from traditional financial market. Information asymmetry can be divided into two branches: activity hidden and information hidden. And respectively they lead to risks of morality and adverse selection. For the sake of limiting the risk of information asymmetry to the lowest level, we should start with the engineering of the financing mode for the risk investment, select suitable financing mode, and improve the risk investors' abilities of reacting to and dealing with the information asymmetry.